Chakravarthi's claim is that the enterprise buying problem has inverted: there is no shortage of good technology, only an impossible fitting problem. Product categories keep colliding — this year's product becomes next year's feature inside somebody else's platform — while underneath, an estate old enough to have mainframes in it stops the business from shipping a feature or plugging in a fintech. He tells it through a credit-model company that had already sold US banks: two or three quarters passed before real dollars arrived, because the product had to be taught to talk to loan origination, portfolio management and a Hogan-era core, and Apexon's job was to find the architecture that crunched that toward thirty days. The budget has moved with the problem — five-to-seven-year run contracts giving way to two- and three-year transformation builds, funded by squeezing a run spend that tooling has already automated — and agents now arrive on top of a stack bought in 2020 and change-managed at great cost. His warning to buyers: SaaS vendors ship to the lowest common denominator, so a niche need sits at the back of the bus, and the real choice is wait, build alongside, or build it yourself. Apexon is the same story seen from the inside — five founder-led companies merged under Goldman Sachs and Everstone, the first bulk of integration done in twelve to eighteen months, flattened to six or seven levels, with the industry's promote-every-two-years reflex deliberately broken. On AI he refuses both pulpits: we overestimate the short run and underestimate the long one, which is precisely why he wants engineers deep rather than promoted.
Worth your time if you are
CIOs deciding what to buy, what to keep and what to retire
Fintech and health-tech founders selling into legacy institutions
Services leaders integrating acquired companies into one brand
Mid-career managers who lost their technical edge
Engineering students weighing GCCs, startups and services firms
